

Do Accidental Wars Happen? Evidence from America's Indian Wars

Andrew A. Szarejko

Author's note: A version of this manuscript received a decision of revise-and-resubmit at the *Journal of Global Security Studies* in 2019. What follows is the revised version that I have submitted.

Abstract: The question of whether war can ever truly be accidental has been the subject of much academic debate. To provide my own answer to this question, I use an oft-ignored part of U.S. history—the so-called “Indian Wars” between Native nations and an expanding United States. Specifically, this research innovation makes use of three militarized conflicts of the nineteenth century—the Black Hawk War (1832), the Cayuse War (1847-1855), and the Hualapai War (1865-1870)—to provide evidence that war can indeed occur accidentally. I conclude that IR scholars should be less confident in asserting that accidental war does not happen and that this possibility counsels restraint for policy-makers, especially in emerging domains of conflict.

1. Introduction

Do accidental wars happen? This question has arisen in International Relations (IR) most visibly in response to concerns that an accidental nuclear war could occur. During the Cold War, academics wondered if accidental nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union could occur, while today U.S. relations with North Korea are the source of many such debates (Leghorn 1958; Frei 1983; Wallace et al. 1986; De Luce et al. 2017). A recent refrain among IR scholars has been that accidental war simply does not happen.

I argue that war can indeed be accidental, and I examine an oft-ignored part of U.S. history—its wars with Native nations—to make my case. This argument has implications for scholars and policy-makers alike. First, IR as a field is missing important phenomena when it ignores the experiences of Indigenous peoples (Ferguson 2016).¹ In examining U.S. relations with Native nations, I thus seek to add to a growing literature in which scholars have demonstrated that other overlooked histories—often in Europe or Asia—can shed new light on old questions (Carvalho et al. 2011; Zarakol 2011; Phillips and Sharman 2015; MacKay 2019). Second, for policy-makers, if accidental wars have happened, this suggests a need for precautions to avoid accidents in the first place and a need to avoid over-reaction in the face of accidents that will inevitably happen in traditional and emerging domains of conflict.

I begin with an overview of the scholarly debate on accidental war, and I then describe the evidence I will bring to bear on the question. I then delineate the processes of conflict initiation in the Black Hawk War (1832), the Cayuse War (1847-1855), and the Hualapai War (1865-1870). I conclude with implications and directions for future research.

2. What is an “accidental” war?

One’s answer to the question of whether war can ever truly be accidental tends to turn on the definition of “accidental”. Trachtenberg (2000, 1) delineates three meanings of the term, though he remains skeptical of the possibility. First, there is accidental war as being triggered by a good-faith error—“a computer goes haywire; responsible authorities conclude the nation is

¹ There are few examples of such work in IR (Crawford 1994; Beier 2005; Cha 2015; Lightfoot 2016; Urlacher 2020). IR scholars have much work from other subfields on which to draw (Evans 2011; Martens 2016; Orr 2017; Dahl 2018).

under attack; the ‘go-code’ is given, the missiles are launched”. Second, there is accidental war as conflict undesired by all parties. “In this view, miscalculation is generally the crucial factor: the war is the result of misjudgments about how the adversary would react to measures taken in the course of the crisis.” Third, there is accidental war as “one in which the political process...is overwhelmed by forces welling up from within the military sphere.” I describe how scholars have discussed these three categories below, and I conclude this section with my own view of what constitutes an accidental war.

To take Trachtenberg’s first category first, believers in the possibility of accidental war would use various incidents of faulty radar readings and other good-faith errors to suggest that humanity has been very lucky to avoid accidental nuclear war (Sagan 1993 and Schlosser 2009). As Robert Gilpin (1988, 613) once argued, the proliferation of nuclear weapons means that, “An accident could unleash powerful and uncontrollable forces totally unanticipated by the protagonists.”² Similarly, Jervis (1976, 31) contended that foreign policy in general is frequently subject to psychological “factors that, from the standpoint of most theories, must be considered accidental,” though his advice on “minimizing misperception” (ibid., 409-424) suggests that governments can reduce but not eliminate their susceptibility to accidents.

Trachtenberg’s second category would most clearly cover arguments about preemptive war or inadvertent escalation. Here a frequent touchstone is World War One and the depiction of

² Skeptics counter that the power of nuclear weapons assures that states take extreme care to avoid accidents. In a debate between Sagan and Waltz (2013, 100), Waltz argues that, “Deterrence...causes countries to take good care of their weapons, and against anonymous use. ... It is hard to believe that nuclear war may begin accidentally, when less frightening conventional wars have rarely done so.” Waltz (240, n. 25) acknowledges that Sagan, with whom he is debating in this book, claims to have found three accidental wars, “not all of which are unambiguous”.

decision-makers “stumbling” or “sleep-walking” into war (Clark 2012; Tuchmann 1962), perhaps abetted by rigid mobilization plans (Levy 1986). Skeptics frequently cite Reiter’s (1995) finding that only 3 of 67 interstate wars between 1816 and 1980 were preemptive and that those wars—World War One, Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War—were also significantly influenced by non-preemptive logics for war.³ Trachtenberg’s own response to this possibility is to say that while escalation may indeed lead states into wars they did not initially desire, “As long as states choose courses of action with their eyes open—if they decide to engage in a test of will, knowing full well that this is what they are doing, and deliberately adopt tactics limiting their own freedom of action...as a way of prevailing in the crisis—then it can scarcely be said that the outcome of that confrontation is to be viewed as essentially an ‘accident.’” (2000, 8).

The third category, in which military machinations undermine the more pacific intentions of policy-makers, is another one in which the example of World War One looms large. While this war was discussed above as a potential example of inadvertent escalation, explanations for World War One that would fit in this category focus on the “cult of the offensive” and civil-military relations in the warring powers (Van Evera 1984; Snyder 1984; Wilcox 2009).⁴ Indeed, in making his own argument that such accidental wars have occurred, Sagan (2000, 9) provides a

³ In informal discussions of accidental war, skeptics occasionally mention Reiter’s article to buttress their claims.

Michael C. Horowitz (2018), for example, writes that, “Accidental war, and even war via miscalculation, is extremely rare,” and he subsequently cites Reiter. Similarly, Daniel W. Altman (2018) asks, “What accidental wars? I’ve looked across modern history. Steve Van Evera has looked. Dan Reiter has looked. Others have looked. Damned hard to find any.”

⁴ As Lieber (2007) details, later histories of World War One have since cast doubt on the war as being accidental, though this does not rule out the possibility that other wars have indeed been accidental.

definition of accidental war that best fits this third category: “For a conflict to be considered an accidental war, there would have to be some activity or incident inside the military machine, without which war would not have occurred.”⁵

I take the first and third categories above to be most appropriately considered “accidental”. That is, I define a war as being accidental if an initiating act of war is either authorized due to a good-faith error or perpetrated by civilians or military officials without proper authorization. This excludes unwanted escalation of the sort in Trachtenberg’s second category. I agree that when policy-makers deliberately escalate a crisis—a situation involving threats in which, “The final decision is left to ‘chance’” (Schelling 1960, 189)—any resulting conflict ought not to be considered accidental. In the cases below, I thus highlight factors that cut against such an interpretation of the events.

3. The Indian Wars, Terms, and Methods

If IR scholars appear to have done little work on the experiences of Native nations, one might suppose that this is because many consider Indian affairs to be “domestic” politics. But federally recognized tribes maintain a government-to-government relationship with the U.S. federal government, and the more distant past surely offers a view of U.S. relations with Native nations as relations between truly sovereign nations (Prucha 1994; Pevar 2012, 82-84). Indeed, the Bureau of Indian Affairs resided in the Department of War until 1849, and the roughly 50 conflicts involving the U.S. and Native nations serious enough for the Census Bureau (1890, 644) to describe them as “wars” accounted for about 17% of U.S. military spending between

⁵ Sagan’s unpublished manuscript (to which Trachtenberg’s piece was a response) notes that it ought not to be cited without permission, which I sought and gratefully received. Trachtenberg’s manuscript has no such disclaimer.

March 4, 1789 and June 30, 1890.

Given that prior research on Native nations has been used to legitimize their marginalization, it is worth the effort to ensure that this research cannot be used for any such purposes (Deloria 1988 [1969], 78-100; Pevar 2012, 2-3). Because I am approaching the topic with a view toward U.S. foreign policy, my references to “Native nations” are concerned with those groups that inhabit what is now the contiguous United States as opposed to, e.g., Alaska Natives or Canada’s First Nations. When practicable, I refer to individual groups or wars by name, and I capitalize “Native” and “Indigenous” in line with current reporting guidelines (NAJA 2018).

One might object that these conflicts ought not to be studied as “wars” or “militarized disputes” but as a genocide. I do not dispute such characterizations (see, e.g. Ostler 2019), and in describing particular instances of violence as “accidental,” I do not intend to contradict those arguments or to elide suffering that was often intentionally inflicted on Native nations. Rather, I would observe that Native nations varied in the forms of resistance they enacted in response to U.S. policies oriented toward expansion. This variation can help scholars to better understand the conditions that make possible different forms of political violence.

I offer three short case studies or vignettes focused on the initiation of different Indian Wars in line with the goal of this study, which is not to show how frequently accidental war happen or under what conditions it happens. Rather, my goal is to convince the reader that accidental wars have happened and that this has implications for modern scholars and policy-makers. I have thus selected cases involving different tribes, involving more than one military engagement, in which the initiation of war appears most clearly accidental, and in which multiple sources attest to the origins of a war (the secondary sources I cite typically rely on primary

sources of both Anglo-American and Native origin).⁶ I argue, however, that it is plausible that these wars would not have occurred absent accidents.

4. The Black Hawk War

The Black Hawk War, so named for a leader of the Sauk people, has its origins in land and treaty disputes. Leaders of the Sauk (or Sac) and Fox (or Meskwaki), both inhabitants of a piece of land that stretches through what is now Wisconsin, Illinois, and Missouri, met with representatives of an expanding United States in 1804 and crafted the Treaty of St. Louis (Frymer 2017, 84). As in many such cases, it is unclear whether the individuals who negotiated a treaty had the authority to do so and whether they fully understood the terms of the agreement in which they purportedly sold their lands east of the Mississippi River to the U.S. (Saler 2015, 116-118). It would be another twenty-four years, however, before the U.S. government would start selling that land to settlers and speculators. Black Hawk, a Sauk leader, would be the only leader in his community willing to challenge U.S. claims to the land with violent resistance; most others did not feel they had much to gain from it (Ostler 2019, 299).

While rival land claims are central to this conflict, I argue that the initiation of the war should nonetheless be seen as accidental. Black Hawk challenged U.S. claims by moving with a group of loyalists into Illinois, east of the Mississippi River—there they would resettle on

⁶ None of these cases meet the commonly cited threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year used to define “war” in the Correlates of War project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Nonetheless, the historical record suggests that both sides involved in these militarized disputes thought of the conflicts as wars, which may be related to the relatively low population of many Native communities and frontier settlements. Similarly, whether one thinks of these as “interstate” wars or, e.g., “extra-state” wars, they were certainly conflicts between distinct political communities.

supposedly ceded land (Prucha 1969, 218-219). The government of Illinois, despite having full knowledge of ongoing negotiations between Black Hawk and the U.S. government and without any reason to fear imminent violence, raised a militia to try to force the Black Hawk and his band back to their remaining territory. When Black Hawk learned that no assistance would be forthcoming from potential allies—including Potawatomis, Winnebagos, and British—he was willing to concede rather than fight. He sent three men toward an approaching militia party with a white flag to make peace and to announce that he and his supporters “would return across the Mississippi” (Jung 2007, 88). The militia members apparently ignored or misunderstood the white flag and took the three men captive; they then fired apparently unauthorized shots at a five-person party that Black Hawk had asked to trail the flag-bearers. The resulting engagement would see Black Hawk’s band repel the militia and kill eleven or twelve of its members (Black Hawk 1999, 67-68; Prucha 1967, 223).

Black Hawk’s victory in May of 1832 was short-lived. After this initial, avoidable skirmish, both Black Hawk and Secretary of War Lewis Cass felt their respective losses needed to be avenged (Ostler 2019, 303). Black Hawk and his followers moved through Illinois into Wisconsin, but they were eventually found and defeated at the Battle of Bad Axe in early August, less than three months after armed conflict began (Wooster 2009, 79). Had the Illinois militia responded to the white flag without their unauthorized violence, it seems likely that the brief war could have been avoided—a resigned Black Hawk may indeed have returned across the Mississippi and accepted life further west or on a reservation, as others of his nation did.

5. The Cayuse War

Just four years after the Black Hawk War, two missionaries by the name of Marcus and

Narcissa Whitman would travel to what is now Washington-Oregon border and establish a mission (Limerick 1987, 37-38). Their job was to convert the local Cayuse to the Methodist faith, though years of frustratingly slow efforts provoked Marcus to muse at least once that their job was primarily about establishing a beachhead for more settlers. As he wrote in a letter to his in-laws, “Our greatest work is to aid the white settlement of this country. ...Indeed, I am convinced that when a people refuse or neglect to fill the designs of Providence, they ought not to complain at the results. ...They have in no case obeyed the command to multiply and replenish the earth and cannot stand in the way of others doing” (Addis 2005, 241). Indeed, between the Whitmans’ arrival in 1836 and 1847, Marcus traveled back to the East coast numerous times to provide his patrons with updates on the mission, to seek further funding, and to then guide more settlers across the Oregon Trail, but the Whitmans do not appear to have won many—if any—converts in those years (Hyde 2011, 404).

In 1847, however, the Cayuse (among other Native and settler populations in the Pacific Northwest) experienced a deadly measles outbreak that killed roughly forty to fifty percent of the tribe (Boyd 1994, 17; Addis 2005, 242). Although the disease likely spread along trade routes running north to south or through port cities, the Cayuse inferred that Marcus had somehow cast the disease upon them or poisoned them with his medicine (Boyd 1994, 13; Limerick 1987, 39-41). (Marcus had been trained as a physician and offered medicine to many Cayuse who nonetheless died throughout his years in Washington.) The measles outbreak spurred the Cayuse to test their suspicions—they sent a healthy individual to Marcus to feign illness and seek treatment. When this individual had the misfortune of contracting measles and dying, the Cayuse had their proof that Marcus was indeed poisoning them (Boyd 1994, 15-16). It was this accident—notably based on a false rumor or belief rather than deliberately spread

misinformation—that led to the Cayuse War, which started when a group of Cayuse attacked the Whitman mission and killed Marcus, Narcissa, and twelve additional settlers.

The provisional government of Oregon raised a militia in response to the so-called Whitman Massacre, and they would eventually confront the Cayuse in February of 1848. Sporadic engagements with the Cayuse over the next two years were inconclusive. Even after the Cayuse sent eight tribe members to stand trial for the murders (five were convicted and executed in June of 1850), it was not until 1855—after being weakened by disease, finding few Native allies, and facing an settler communities that increasingly sought to restrict the sale of firearms to the Cayuse (Ruby and Brown 2005 [1972], 141-142)—that they would formally surrender and cede much of their land (Addis 2005, 248). Was this, however, an accidental war? Despite early tension due to disease and competition for scarce resources, relations between the Cayuse and Anglo-Americans had been generally peaceful for more than a decade even under that stress—indeed, the Cayuse even profited off their improvement of a toll road going through the Grande Ronde Valley (Unruh, Jr. 1993, 159). It would thus seem appropriate to emphasize the more proximate cause of the war here—in this case, an epidemic mistakenly perceived by the Cayuse to have been intentionally inflicted on them. The Cayuse misunderstanding would thus seem to fit my definition of accidental war—the appropriate authorities made a decision for war, but they did so due to a good-faith error amid circumstances that did not otherwise appear primed for war.

6. The Hualapai War

In 1857, an expedition led by Edward Fitzgerald Beale established a trail that cut through land controlled by the Hualapai (sometimes spelled Walapai) (Shepherd 2010, 29-33). Relations between the Hualapai and traveling settlers nonetheless remained relatively tranquil until, as

happened elsewhere in the West, a gold rush brought more settlers across the trail and through Native territory. Within a year of the 1863 gold rush, Captain William Hardy created a toll road along the trail, and by 1865 Hardy had also established a ferry to help settlers cross the Colorado River for a fee.

It is against this backdrop that the Hualapai War began. As recorded by the BIA official John C. Dunn, the United States had no particular quarrel with the Hualapai and assumed that the best way forward was to establish a reservation for them (Dunn 1865, 34). Indeed, the Hualapai were seemingly ambivalent toward the expanding United States—it was only the killing of one of their leaders that would spark war. The historical record is not clear on exactly how the meeting came to be, but it seems that a Hualapai leader, Anasa (sometimes transcribed as Ana:sa), met with illegal settlers on Hualapai land in April 1865 (Shepherd 2010, 33). The “wanton and intoxicated squatters” killed Anasa, and the Hualapai retaliated by killing a prospector—both sides continued with this sort of retribution, and by four weeks after Anasa’s death, Dunn (1865, 34) would write that, “They have been on the warpath, and we have felt their power.”

While the violent reprisals eventually subsided and gave way to several months of a truce, another settler killing of a Hualapai leader, Waubu Yuma, would reignite the conflict (Shepherd 2010, 33-34; Thrapp 1967, 39-40). Sporadic violence continued for years until the Hualapais were hobbled by outbreaks of disease that prompted many to surrender. Some resisted for another year but ultimately accepted a peace that would entail life on a reservation. Like the Black Hawk War, this war would seem to meet Trachtenberg’s standard for an accidental war of the sort “in which the political process...is overwhelmed by forces welling up from within the military sphere,” the “forces” in this case being drunken settlers with no authority to initiate

conflict.⁷ Moreover, the previously peaceful relations with the Hualapai and their subsequent acceptance of a reservation suggest that the war was not inevitable.

7. Conclusion

Can war occur accidentally? I have answered in the affirmative. In the Black Hawk War, U.S. militia men fired unauthorized shots at a Sauk party bearing a white flag. The Cayuse War may have started with the entirely intentional killing of a missionary couple and their compatriots, but this was, to the Cayuse, not so much an initiation as a reprisal for the seemingly intentional spreading of measles to the Cayuse. The Hualapai War began with a drunken settler's unsanctioned killing of a Hualapai leader. These conflicts suggest that accidental war is possible and that skeptics should take this possibility more seriously.

To build on this work, future research might ask whether accidental conflicts are made more or less likely by new international organizations and practices such as UN peacekeeping (Howard 2019), the spread of false rumors and disinformation via new and traditional media (Snyder and Ballentine 1996), and elite reliance on paramilitaries and militias (Carey et al. 2013). I would note, however, that emerging technologies have prompted ongoing debate about the chances of accidents in foreign policy. For example, in discussing the role of autonomous weapons systems (Bode and Huelss 2019; Johnson 2020) and the difficulties of attribution in cyberspace (McDermott 2019; Raymond 2020), scholars have noted the risk of accidents and the possibilities of risk mitigation in these novel domains. Nonetheless, accidents can and will

⁷ Settlers—and the territorial conflicts they can incite—are not confined to the nineteenth century. As Eiran and Krause (2018) point out, some Israeli settlers have used violence to seek to bring the Israeli state into a wider conflict on their behalf.

happen in emerging and traditional areas of international competition. What this suggests is a need for investment in high-quality intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination and for restraint among policy-makers who ought to avoid hasty accusations or other reactions to events that may not have been intentional.

Works Cited

- Addis, Cameron. 2005. "The Whitman Massacre: Religion and Manifest Destiny on the Columbia Plateau, 1809-1858." *Journal of the Early Republic* 25 (2): 221-258.
- Altman, Daniel W. January 13, 2018. "What accidental wars? I've looked across modern history. Steve Van Evera has looked. Dan Reiter has looked. Others have looked. Damned hard to find any." Accessed April 15, 2019.
https://twitter.com/daltman_IR/status/952246020737466370.
- Beier, J. Marshall. 2005. *International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology, and the Limits of International Theory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Black Hawk. 1999 [1833]. *Black Hawk's Autobiography*. Nichols, Roger L. (ed.) Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- Bode, Ingvild and Hendrik Huelss. 2019. "Introduction to the Special Section: The Autonomisation of Weapons Systems: Challenges to International Relations." *Global Policy* 10 (3): 327-330.
- Boyd, Robert. 1994. "The Pacific Northwest Measles Epidemic of 1847-1848." *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 95 (1): 6-47.
- Carey, Sabine C., Neil J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe. "States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-government Militias." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (2): 249-258.
- Carvalho, Benjamin de, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson. 2011. "The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919." *Millennium* 39 (3): 735-758.
- Cha, Taesuh. 2015. "The Formation of American Exceptional Identities: A Three-tier Model of

- the 'Standard of Civilization' in US Foreign Policy." *European Journal of International Relations* 21 (4): 743-767.
- Clark, Christopher. 2012. *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Crawford, Neta C. 1994. "A Security Regime among Democracies: Cooperation among Iroquois Nations." *International Organization* 48 (3): 345-385.
- Dahl, Adam. 2018. *Empire of the People: Settler Colonialism and the Foundations of Modern Democratic Thought*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Deloria, Jr., Vine. 1988 [1969]. *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- De Luce, Dan, Jenna McLaughlin, and Elias Groll. October 18, 2017. "Armageddon By Accident." *Foreign Policy*. Accessed April 15, 2019.
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/armageddon-by-accident-north-korea-nuclear-war-missiles/>.
- Dunn, John C. May 23, 1865. "Letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs" in United States. 1936. *Walapai Papers: Historical Reports, Documents, and Extracts from Publications Relating to the Walapai Indians of Arizona*. Washington: Government Printing Office. 33-34.
- Eiran, Ehud and Peter Krause. 2018. "Old (Molotov) Cocktails in New Bottles? 'Price-tag' and Settler Violence in Israel and the West Bank." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30 (4): 637-657.
- Evans, Laura E. 2011. *Power From Powerlessness: Tribal Governments, Institutional Niches, and American Federalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Ferguson, Kennan. 2016. "Why Does Political Science Hate American Indians?." *Perspectives on Politics* 14 (4): 1,029-1,038.
- Frei, Daniel. 1983. *Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.
- Frymer, Paul. 2017. *Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1988. "The Theory of Hegemonic War." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (4): 591-613.
- Horowitz, Michael C. January 3, 2018. "Interesting sentence here about how every war in history was an accident. What? In fact, accidental war, and even war via miscalculation, is extremely rare (<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539227>). Also, see @ProfSaunders and I today: (link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/03/why-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-is-less-likely-than-you-think/?utm_term=.2c6062641328)."
- Accessed April 15, 2019. <https://twitter.com/mchorowitz/status/948681589059301376>.
- Howard, Lise Morjé. 2019. *Power in Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hyde, Anne F. 2011. *Empires, Nations, and Families: A New History of the North American West, 1800-1860*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, James. 2020. "Delegating Strategic Decision-making to Machines: Dr. Strangelove Redux?" *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Published online at <<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1759038>>.
- Jung, Patrick J. 2007. *The Black Hawk War of 1832*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Leghorn, Richard S. 1958. "The Problem of Accidental War." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*

14 (6): 205-209.

Levy, Jack S. 1986. "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 30 (2): 193-222.

Lieber, Keir. 2007. "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory." *International Security* 32 (2): 155-191.

Lightfoot, Sheryl. 2016. *Global Indigenous Politics: A Subtle Revolution*. London: Routledge.

Limerick, Patricia Nelson. 1987. *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

MacKay, Joseph. 2019. "Rethinking Hierarchies in East Asian Historical IR." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 4 (4): 598-611.

Martens, Stephanie B. 2016. *The Americas in Early Modern Political Theory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

McDermott, Rose. 2019. "Some Emotional Considerations in Cyber Conflict." *Journal of Cyber Policy* 4 (3): 309-325.

Native American Journalists Association (NAJA). 2018. "Reporting and Indigenous Terminology." *Native American Journalists Association*. Accessed April 15, 2019. https://najanewsroom.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/NAJA_Reporting_and_Indigenous_Terminology_Guide.pdf.

Orr, Raymond I. 2017. *Reservation Politics: Historical Trauma, Economic Development, and Intratribal Conflict*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Ostler, Jeffrey. 2019. *Surviving Genocide: Native Nations and the United States from the American Revolution to Bleeding Kansas*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pevar, Stephen L. 2012. *The Rights of Indians and Tribes*. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Phillips, Andrew and J.C. Sharman. 2015. "Explaining Durable Diversity in International Systems: State, Company, and Empire in the Indian Ocean." *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (3): 436-448.

Prucha, Francis Paul. 1994. *American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 1967. *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Raymond, Mark. 2020. "Social Practices of Rule-Making for International Law in the Cyber Domain." *Journal of Global Security Studies*. Published online at <<https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz065>>.

Reiter, Dan. 1995. "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen." *International Security* 20 (2): 5-34.

Ruby, Robert H. and John A. Brown. 2005 [1972]. *The Cayuse Indians: Imperial Tribesmen of Old Oregon*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Sagan, Scott D. 1993. *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2000. "Accidental War in Theory and Practice." Unpublished manuscript. Accessed April 15, 2019. <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/cv.html>.

Sagan, Scott D., and Waltz, Kenneth N. 2013. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Saler, Bethel. 2015. *The Settlers' Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America's Old Northwest*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

- Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman. 2010. *Resort to War: 1816 - 2007*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Schlosser, Eric. 2013. *Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Shepherd, Jeffrey P. 2010. *We Are an Indian Nation: A History of the Hualapai People*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Snyder, Jack. 1984. "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984." *International Security* 9 (1): 108-146.
- Snyder, Jack and Karen Ballentine. 1996. "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas." *International Security* 21 (2): 5-40.
- Thrapp, Dan L. 1967. *The Conquest of Apacheria*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Trachtenberg, Marc. 2000. "The 'Accidental War' Question." Unpublished manuscript. Accessed April 15, 2019. <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/cv.html>.
- Tuchmann, Barbara W. 1962. *The Guns of August*. New York: The Macmillan Publishing Company.
- United States Census Bureau. 1890. "Indian Wars, Their Cost, and Civil Expenditures" in *Eleventh Census, Vol. 10*. 637-644. Accessed April 15, 2019. <https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1894/dec/volume-10.html>.
- Unruh, Jr., John D. 1993 [1979]. *The Plains Across: The Overland Emigrants and the Trans-Mississippi West, 1840-60*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Urlacher, Brian R. 2020. "Introducing Native American Conflict History (NACH) Data." Manuscript prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Convention.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War."

International Security 9 (1): 58-107.

Wallace, Michael D., Brian L. Crissey, and Linn I. Sennott. 1986. "Accidental Nuclear War: A

Risk Assessment." *Journal of Peace Research* 23 (1): 9-27.

Wilcox, Lauren. 2009. "Gendering the Cult of the Offensive." *Security Studies* 18 (2): 214-240.

Wooster, Robert. 2009. *The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West,*

1783-1900. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Zarakol, Ayşe. 2011. *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West*. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.